



American Model United Nations
**Commission on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice**

**Report to the Commission on Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice on International
cooperation in combating transnational
organized crime and corruption**

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1 Executive Summary

2 The Commission of Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice met from 24 November 2024 to 26
3 November 2024, and we are thrilled to present our final report on the topic of International Collaboration
4 in Combating Transnational Organized Crime. The following report includes a large number of different
5 topics ranging from prison system infrastructure to technology for crime prevention, all of which the
6 body feels are urgent matters for a larger commission to discuss in regards to combating organized
7 crime and corruption. We recommend this report for immediate adoption by the Economic and Social
8 Council of the United Nations.

9 The first chapter of this report includes one resolution and multiple other proposed recommen-
10 dations made by the body for the Economic and Social Council to take into consideration.

11 The Commission also proposed Resolution 2.1, which addresses the increasing complexity of
12 transnational cybercrimes and highlights the dual role of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as both a tool for
13 combating cybercrime and potential risk if misused by bad actors. It recommends strengthening re-
14 gional partnerships for cybersecurity through utilizing machine learning programs, integrating AI tech-
15 nologies into frameworks to combat terrorism funded by crypto-currency by expanding into fraud de-
16 tection and prevention, and aligning AI use with sustainable practices by encouraging Member States
17 to advocate for the use of sustainable energy in conjunction with AI development.

18 The body proposed recommendations regarding United Nations plans and programs of ac-
19 tion relating to sovereignty and its implications, corruption within the lower levels of governments and
20 courts and the need for international cooperation in identifying the root of the many branches of traf-
21 ficking and combating it at its ends.

22 The report also recommends the creation of specialized task forces for combating crime as well
23 as the expansion of existing ones and the implementation of sustainable frameworks to reduce traf-
24 ficking in drugs, weapons, humans, wildlife and artifacts. Additionally, the Commission advocates for
25 education programs for capacity building in developing nations ensuring a comprehensive approach
26 to crime prevention and justice reform.

27 The second chapter of the report delves into the key deliberations that informed the body's
28 judgments and recommendations. These discussions emphasized the balance between upholding
29 national sovereignty and recommending international action, the impact of climate change on AI and
30 technology for transnational crime prevention and the trade-offs between rehabilitative and punitive
31 approaches to incarceration. Additionally, the body considered the role of international courts such as
32 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as well as
33 the benefits of an optional international database for collaboration. While not all of these topics were
34 included in the final resolutions or recommendations, they were acknowledged as requiring further
35 discussion.

36 **2 Matters calling for action**

37 **2.1 Resolution II/1**

38 *Acknowledging* the escalating complexity and frequency of transnational cyber crimes, includ-
39 ing fraud, crypto-currency related terrorism financing and data breaches,

40 *Recognizing* the potential of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as a transformative tool for detecting,
41 preventing, and responding to cyber crime,

42 *Noting* the need to balance technological advancement with sustainability goals to align AI
43 deployment with development strategies,

44 *Alarmed by* the urgency for robust governance mechanisms to prevent potential abuses of AI
45 in cybersecurity from bad actors,

46 1. The promotion of regional cybersecurity alliances through:

47 (a) The promotion of regional cybersecurity alliances through;

48 (i) The encouragement the development of region-specific strategies that address unique
49 cybercrime challenges faced by Member States;

50 (ii) The establishment of or the reinforcement of regional networks for intelligence shar-
51 ing, capacity building and coordinated responses to cyber threats;

52 (iii) Allocating financial resources to support joint cybersecurity initiatives, including re-
53 search and training programs;

54 2. *Encourages* Member States to leverage AI technologies in addressing climate concerns while
55 minimizing environmental impact, with a focus on sustainable computing practices such as:

56 (a) Advocating for energy-efficient data servers, including the transition to low-carbon
57 computing infrastructure;

58 (b) Supporting the use of renewable energy to power facilities and incentivizing carbon
59 offset initiatives for both private and public large scale server farms;

60 (c) Establishing a body of experts within the United Nations High-level Committee on
61 Programmes (HLCP) aimed at assisting States in their cyber security concerns and needs;

62 3. Encouraging Member States to promote funding from all public and private sources to meet
63 the 2023 UN Summit efforts for the accumulation of the projected \$1.3 trillion US dollars in climate fi-
64 nance by 2035, aimed at integration of future renewable energy resources:

65 (a) Encouraging Member States to promote funding from all public and private sources
66 to meet the 2023 United Nations Summit efforts for the accumulation of the projected \$1.3 trillion US
67 dollars in climate finance by 2035, aimed at integration of future renewable energy resources;

68 (b) Recognizing the national security risk posed by the increasing rate of natural disas-
69 ters, addressing the harms and existentialism presented by the threat of climate change particularly
70 in rural areas most affected by transnational crime;

71 (c) Emphasizing the extent to which poverty in the Global South is driven by increased
72 global warming, especially as it pertains to the increase in transnational organized crime, as these
73 organizations often serve to bridge the gap carved out by the increase in natural disasters;

74 4. Encourages Member States to integrate advanced machine learning programs into regional
75 cybersecurity frameworks, with a focus on:

76 (a) Detecting and preventing fraud through;

77 (i) Facilitating public-private partnerships to deploy machine learning tools which an-
78alyze anomalies in transactional data;

79 (b) Addressing cryptocurrency-related terrorism financing by;

- 80 (i) Promoting the exchange of technical expertise among Member States to enhance the
81 capacity for identifying and disrupting terrorist financing through decentralized digital
82 currencies;
- 83 (ii) Implementing AI-based blockchain analysis systems which utilize pattern recogni-
84 tion in tracing cryptocurrency usage related to illicit activities;
- 85 (c) Verification of quality through;
- 86 (i) Encouraging the increased use and development of pattern recognition technology
87 to reduce the margin of error within relevant technology;
- 88 (ii) Promoting voluntary submission of qualitative reports on the performance of AI tech-
89 nology;
- 90 5. *Calling upon* Member States to acknowledge and support the sovereignty of individuals na-
91 tions' development and use of AI technologies.

92 **2.2 Corruption within Lower - Levels of Governments and Courts**

93 The body recommends that the Economic and Social Council evaluate the ways in which law
94 enforcement officers and judicial officials are kept accountable; we encourage the Economic and So-
95 cial Council to draft a framework that would increase transparency on bribery among officers. This is
96 in order to address the corruption at lower levels of government which remains a persistent challenge
97 in many countries, undermining public trust and hindering effective governance due to this form of
98 corruption often involving the misuse of power positions by local officials.

99 **2.3 International Cooperation**

100 The body calls for the implementation of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTER-
101 POL) database which stores information to assist in combating organized crime which is accessible
102 to all national and subnational law enforcement agencies Austria calls for increased cooperation be-
103 tween INTERPOL and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

104 The Commission also recommends the creation of a Transnational Crime Task Force within UN-
105 ODC, including representatives from various States to help aid in intelligence sharing and joint opera-
106 tions against organized crime. This task force would help set laws to prevent smuggling from country
107 to country. This task force will be focused on certain regions to effectively combat transnational crime
108 while also protecting the sovereignty of collaborative nations.

109 The body calls for the strengthening of current courts to effectively administer justice and com-
110 bat transnational crime that would operate on a region-wide basis. With the use of the CJEU to help
111 create and organize these new organizations until they are able to fully function without the help of the
112 CJEU.

113 The Commission recommends cooperation between Member States in order to improve the
114 justice system and law enforcement cooperation with international organizations such as the United
115 Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), to pro-
116 vide support to developing states in improving their justice systems and law enforcement.

117 The body calls for work with international organizations, such as the United Nations Office of
118 Counter-Terrorism, to combat the rise of terrorist transnational advocacy groups such as Al Qaeda
119 and ISIS.

120 The Commission further recommends increased manpower, as well as more frequent utilization
121 of INTERPOL internationally and European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL)
122 as well as others regionally, to help coordinate and provide a forum for ideas to combat international
123 crimes. Also, for the increase in manpower and funding especially for UNODC as it is a great, yet very,
124 underfunded organization.

125 The body endorses the use of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to help
126 supplement these recommendations. The cooperating NGOs (such as the UNDCP, IMO, and the United

127 Nations Asia and Far East Institute) can provide consulting commissions as well as community service
128 agents depending on the preferences of individual countries. NGOs should act as a third party agent
129 in the Member States. Measures should be taken to ensure transparency and accountability for their
130 activities, such as government's checks and balances and occasional activity reports.

131 The body recommends an expansion of the United Nations Convention on Organized Crime
132 Treaty to include definitions of individual, organized and state-sponsored cybercrime and state-sponsored
133 migrant trafficking.

134 The Commission recommends the strengthening of international cooperation to combat transna-
135 tional crime and terrorism, emphasizing the importance of enhancing law enforcement and justice
136 systems through collaboration with international organizations, as well as regional cooperation to ad-
137 dress issues such as human trafficking and piracy.

138 **2.4 Drugs, Humans and Weapons - Transnational Trafficking**

139 The body recommends that the Economic and Social Council evaluate the ways in which law
140 enforcement officers and judicial officials are kept accountable; we encourage the Economic and So-
141 cial Council to draft a framework that would increase transparency on bribery among officers. This is
142 in order to address the corruption at lower levels of government which remains a persistent challenge
143 in many countries, undermining public trust and hindering effective governance due to this form of
144 corruption often involving the misuse of power positions by local officials.

145 **2.5 Wildlife - Transnational Trafficking**

146 The body recommends Member States move to identify and dismantle illegal breeding op-
147 erations meant for international distribution within the means of their domestic systems. As well as
148 the acknowledgement of the smuggling and illegal trade of endangered species across international
149 borders. Additionally, the body recommends the strengthening of the existing international framework
150 addressing the illegal trade of endangered animals.

151 The body recommends further engagement with the Convention on International Trade in En-
152 dangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES). The body would specifically like to recommend
153 actions be taken to strengthen the administrative capabilities of CITES.

154 The body recommends increased data collection, including the creation of a list of Member
155 States with the most heavily trafficked animals for easier recognition of animals that are commonly
156 trafficked for the black market pet trade. The body endorses an expansion of the framework to discern
157 between legal trade with errors or lost documents and true illegal animal trade operations.

158 The body supports capacity building within weaker wildlife protection agencies and advocates
159 for stricter international regulations to combat illegal trade with animal and plant products sourced
160 through poaching.

161 **2.6 Resources - Transnational Trafficking**

162 The body recommends Member States enforce stricter measures and increased policing of the
163 illegal harvesting and extraction of resources within the boundaries of their borders to the best of their
164 abilities. This will incentivize the increased monitoring of resource extraction within members to the
165 best of their abilities. The body recommends a classification system to quantify orders of suspicion on
166 frequently smuggled resources. Attention is to be paid to the connection between smuggled resources
167 and their country of origin. The body recommends the international cooperation of Member States to
168 address the bunkering of international oil pipelines.

169 **2.7 Artifacts - Transnational Trafficking**

170 The body recommends Member States institute local policies and to work with international
171 agencies to the best of their abilities to stop the looting of artifacts, their removal from the origin country
172 and their use to fund criminal and terrorist activity.

173 For the prevention of terrorism, the body encourages the Economic and Social Council support
174 of initiatives that investigate the origins of recently obtained artifacts. To ensure that they have not
175 been obtained through illegal means and have not been used to fund criminal or terrorist organiza-
176 tions. Further, the body recommends that the Economic and Social Council establish a precedent for
177 member states. This is to move towards returning recently obtained artifacts to their countries of origin.
178 If traffickers and transnational criminal organizations have been identified to have been their sources,
179 with the protection of artifacts under state sovereignty.

180 **2.8 Educational Programs**

181 The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice recommends that the Economic
182 and Social Council further consider outreach to children as a method of crime prevention by increas-
183 ing access to education, considering that increased access to education would reduce recruitment
184 of children at a young age from falling victim to recruitment of criminal networks, instead providing
185 alternative activities and professions.

186 The Commission suggests that these educational programmes include access to mentors, ex-
187 tracurricular activities, quality curriculum, and vocational and professional training, along with the
188 adoption of shelters, or the opportunity to stay in schools past operational hours, in order to assure
189 children are at a decreased risk of joining criminal organizations.

190 The programs which the Commission believes are important for the Economic and Social Coun-
191 cil to address are those supporting individuals at risk, including counseling and emergency services.

192 The Commission also believes that it would be in the interest of the Economic and Social Council
193 to provide children with access to a steady and reliable source of food within educational systems.

194 The Commission further recommends reducing recidivism in individuals under the age of twenty-
195 five that have already committed an offense through educational programs and forgiveness of of-
196 fenses upon completion.

197 The Commission additionally believes that the Economic and Social Council supports global
198 nonprofits raising money for developing countries in the adoption of educational initiatives, though do-
199 nations from other organizations or countries, outside of the already existing global nonprofits, should
200 also be considered.

201 The Commission further suggests the adoption of programs designed with the intention of ad-
202 dressing human trafficking and youth corruption, including the need to strengthen community net-
203 works and law enforcement operations.

204 **3 Consideration of the status**

205 **3.1 Climate Change**

206 The delegation from Canada raised concerns for the energy usage and costs of AI. The dele-
207 gation from China responded to this concern by explaining the non-intensive costs of particular AI.

208 Then, Libya brought up concerns for the lack of genuine connection between the climate clause
209 and its link to the topic of transnational organized crime.

210 **3.2 Machine Learning Programs**

211 The body was split into two blocs during unmoderated caucus. One bloc, consisting of the dele-
212 gations from Cuba, Austria, Qatar, Brazil, Armenia, the United Kingdom and Canada, led by the delega-
213 tions: Belarus, China and Pakistan. The Bloc discussed the creation of a resolution aimed at implemen-
214 tation of artificial intelligence under the topic on International cooperation in combating transnational
215 organized crime and corruption.

216 First, the delegation from Pakistan addressed instances of AI use in corruption. The delegation
217 from the United States of America looked favorably upon this sentiment and expressed support for
218 the usage of AI in certain instances. Then, the delegation from China clarified that the focus of the
219 resolution would be the utility of AI in cyber security.

220 Then, the delegation from the United States of America agreed with outlining the specifics of
221 what areas AI would be used in. This was affirmed by the delegation from Bulgaria who supported
222 specification of the concerned language.

223 Then, the delegation from Pakistan explained that AI was particularly useful in the realm of pat-
224 tern recognition suggesting AI audits in financial records. This received support from the delegation
225 from China who agreed with application of AI in monetary systems and coordinated attacks.

226 Then, the delegation from Pakistan established the urgency of the issue detailing how five years
227 would result in AI in the hands of governmental bad actors.

228 Then, the delegation from Armenia suggested clauses for usage in education. This was sup-
229 ported by the delegation from Bulgaria. Then, the delegation from Madagascar suggested utilizing text
230 to speech AI technology.

231 Then, the delegation from China and Pakistan explained the analytical and learning capacity of
232 AI. Then, the delegation from Pakistan raised concerns of AI server racks, particularly overconsumption.
233 They then advocated for the utilization of Learning Language Model (LLM) type AI.

234 Then, the delegation from Cuba raised concerns for a backup system in the event the technol-
235 ogy crashes. The delegation from the United States of America responded to this concern by stating
236 that Member States would implement, but not rely on the technology. This sentiment was echoed by
237 the delegation from Pakistan who detailed the customization abilities of AI.

238 Then, the delegation from China expressed concerns for the United States of America to house
239 servers for AI. The delegation from the United States of America responded to this concern affirming
240 that the United States of America likely would not agree. This sentiment was echoed by the delegation
241 from Pakistan who expressed unaddressed financial concerns. Then, the delegation from China re-
242 sponded to this concern, providing that the high costs of different technology could be traded off with
243 the proposed centers for AI.

244 Then, the delegation from Pakistan suggested historically successful Chinese cloud servers as
245 a solution to the storage issue. They furthered by establishing the need to address crypto trading
246 concerns and integration of machine learning programs to mitigate fraud.

247 Then, Finland brought up a point to amend points two and three. Following, China brought up
248 that these clauses are productive and would be beneficial to anyone who is in favor of enacting it.
249 Then, Guatemala brought up how AI is wrong twenty percent of the time and asked for any response
250 in clarification about this statistic.

251 Next, Pakistan explained that this technology is going to keep evolving rapidly over time and
252 even with concerns about inaccuracy the kinks will work out the sooner this resolution is passed. By
253 preventing cases of nations asking for help it will allow for sovereignty even further.

254 Then, Finland brought up how, yes, these technologies are still in the working process, however,
255 the sooner we enact the usage of it the faster the process will happen with working out global diplo-
256 macy.

257 **3.3 Regional Partnerships**

258 The delegation from Madagascar questioned if there were specific AI services in mind for the
259 resolution. The delegations from China and Pakistan responded that services could be both purchased
260 or developed by nations.

261 Then, the delegation from the United States of America urged the bloc to focus on the goal of
262 cyber security and infrastructure. This sentiment was echoed by the delegation from Pakistan who
263 suggested enhanced regional partnerships.

264 Then, the delegation from China expressed the concern for timeframe and preventative care.
265 This sentiment was echoed by the delegations from Pakistan and Belarus.

266 Then, the delegation from Canada suggested an expert sharing program for underdeveloped
267 nations.

268 Then, The United Kingdom brought up their troubled perspective of not having financial capa-
269 bilities, and Questioned what funding there would be and where it is coming from. They also denied
270 helpful regional alliances.

271 Then, Pakistan started to express that regional alliances can very much be successful, but it is
272 especially important to consider what nations are cooperating with each other.

273 Following, The United Kingdom brought up a point to amend the clause about sovereignty since
274 this has caused problems on the global stage in the past.

275 Next, Finland added that this is all about communication between different States. They brought
276 up working together with regional allies further and do not see the problem with enacting the resolution.

277 Next, the United Kingdom asked about how AI technology will be widely used globally due to the
278 fact that some States don't even have the funds for a general power grid.

279 Next, China responded saying that not all countries will be able to enact it but can further reach
280 out for technological support, and that it is important to start using these methods before people who
281 are dangerous receive the technology and emit more transnational crime and corruption.

282 Then, Brazil asked if there will be any way to regulate the protection of each nation's data in
283 terms of transnational crime.

284 **3.4 Corruption**

285 The body scattered into various blocs. One bloc, consisting of the delegates from Brazil, Cuba,
286 Egypt and Guatemala, led by the delegate from Bulgaria discussed their upcoming actions to present
287 their topic draft of suggestions to the dais.

288 First, the delegation from Bulgaria and Egypt discussed the removal of the cyber task force sub
289 section from section 2.2 of a proposed draft resolution.

290 Then, the delegation from Guatemala presented section 2.5, aimed at corruption of youth, to
291 the bloc. They received mainly positive feedback with suggestions for reformatting.

292 Then, the delegation from Czechia approached the bloc to suggest enhanced cooperation with
293 the delegation from Ghana. Then, the delegation from Ghana approached the bloc.

294 Then, the delegation from Brazil explained the values of their draft of recommendations to the
295 delegation from Ghana. They received a favorable response from the delegation from Ghana.

296 Then, the delegation from Bulgaria suggested that the draft did not need to be cooperative
297 with the delegation from Ghana. This received mixed responses from the bloc. There were positive
298 responses from the delegations from Brazil and Egypt. The bloc ultimately decided it would stay un-
299 collaborative with the delegation from Ghana and the rest of the body.

300 Then, the delegation from Czechia noted an issue with the Interpol section of the draft. This re-
301 ceived negative reactions from the delegations from Egypt and Brazil who were concerned with con-
302 stantly changing the draft document.

303 Then, the delegation from Brazil decided to submit section 2.2 of their draft as a resolution.

304 Then, the delegation from Czechia shifted the conversation to reforming section 2.2 of the draft.
305 They suggested that there were already standards for humanitarian aid, and instead the section should
306 be written to uphold and reiterate existing standards. They received support from the entire bloc for
307 this change.

308 China brought up the United Nations Convention against Corruption. They state that the purview
309 of that document and this committee have overlap, and are wondering if the authors of the working
310 report would be amenable to modifying language within the report.

311 Ghana spoke about anti-corruption stating that if border officers are willing to take bribes, the
312 number of them doesn't matter. They feel that corruption is a significant issue. Brazil then called at-
313 tention to section 2.1.

314 Cuba shifted the topic to criminal justice. They wondered if the humanitarian route is the cor-
315 rect choice for them regarding prisons and rights for prisoners. Bulgaria responded and questioned
316 Cuba's viewpoints regarding rights for prisoners. Czechia then pointed out the United Nations' prior
317 documentation on prisoners' rights and stated that we can implement it.

318 Czechia supported Pakistan's concerns and agreed that amendments to strengthen anti-corruption
319 measures were necessary. They emphasized that addressing law enforcement corruption would bol-
320 ster international efforts to curb trafficking and related crimes.

321 **3.5 International Cooperation**

322 The body entered a consultative session under topic 2, moderated by the delegation of Bul-
323 garia. They provided that the main focus of discussion would be their suggestions under their pre-
324 sented report. They began by directing attention to section 2.3, concerned with international cooper-
325 ation through NGOs.

326 Then, the delegation from Brazil motioned for a point of inquiry raising concerns about alterna-
327 tive wording for the report, which suggested tones of being a resolution. The delegation from Bulgaria
328 responded by outlining the alternative creation of the database for clarity.

329 Then, the delegation from Finland motioned for a point of inquiry questioning the benefit of
330 creating Bulgaria's suggested database instead offering INTERPOL databases as an alternative. This
331 sentiment was echoed by the delegations from Czechia and Cuba.

332 Then, the delegation from Cuba expanded upon these ideas presenting concerns of needlessly
333 creating more international courts. This sentiment was echoed by the delegation from Pakistan who
334 worried that additional international courts would take power from current international courts and
335 remove their focus.

336 Then, the delegation from Brazil posed extensions in regards to the extent NGOs support their
337 work. They received a point of inquiry from the delegation Cuba who questioned the type of extensions
338 the delegation from Brazil suggested. The delegation from Brazil responded that there could be more
339 specific examples as to how NGOs could play a better role in implementation. They received a second
340 point of inquiry from Czechia who questioned the success of IGOs as opposed to NGOs. The delegation
341 from Brazil responded that both should be used. They received a third point of inquiry from the delega-
342 tion from the United Kingdom who reminded the delegation of Brazil of their own corrupt NGOs raising
343 the higher question of what advocates for the report considered of the qualifications of potential NGO's.
344 The delegation from Brazil responded that while there were corrupt NGOs, they strongly urged the body
345 to consider their usefulness in enhancing the lives of many people.

346 Then, the delegation from Czechia clarified the inception of IGOs. Having been created when
347 countries work together, and they stated that they were less susceptible than NGOs. They received a
348 point of inquiry from the delegation from Ghana questioning if both could be used and suggesting a
349 possible group centered on IGOs. The delegation from Czechia responded that due to the nature of
350 IGOs being inter-governmental, they had more trust. They suggested that there should not be many
351 NGOs working on governmental issues. They received a second point of inquiry from Austria who ques-
352 tioned the harms of misuse and inaccessibility. The delegation from Czechia responded that it was up
353 to each country whether or not they decided to implement IGOs as they were a suggestion.

354 Then, the delegation from Japan described that the aforementioned section was blatantly tar-
355 geted towards the United Kingdom expressing their disapproval. They reminded the body to focus on
356 unbiased resolutions.

357 Then, the delegation from the United Kingdom thanked the delegation from Japan for their con-
358 cerns, outlining their own concerns for organizational training of United Nations officials. They looked
359 unfavorably upon the solvency of artifact retrieval describing its illegality within their own state. They
360 received a point of inquiry from the delegation of Bulgaria questioning whether the United Kingdom in-
361 tended for the section to be removed or changed. The delegation from the United Kingdom responded
362 that it was up to what the body agreed allowing for edits.

363 Then, the delegation from Brazil stated that the section on artifacts in its entirety slightly veered
364 off topic, and should be removed due to its irrelevancy. This sentiment was echoed by the delegations
365 from Japan and Finland.

366 Then, the delegation from Cuba motioned for a point of information questioning what types of
367 technology would be used to tackle the prison systems. This was unaddressed.

368 Then, the delegation from Canada questioned how states would agree to the creation of addi-
369 tional international courts without impeding on international sovereignty. They suggested the expan-
370 sion of existing courts.

371 Then, the delegation from Czechia stated that as the author of section 2.4, the purpose was to
372 focus on modern illegal trading of historical artifacts which were illegally smuggled and used to fund
373 terrorists from their countries of origin. They reminded the body that the intention of the section was
374 not to regain stolen artifacts from any state.

375 Then, the delegation from South Africa motioned for a point of information questioning how to
376 fix the issues lesser developed countries face such as: limited resources, outdated infrastructure and
377 unequal access in prison population. Then, the delegation from Brazil responded that the suggestion
378 included regional groups to encourage help from first world countries. They received a second point
379 of inquiry from the delegation from South Africa questioning how African countries would be aided
380 and included. The delegation from Brazil responded that they aimed to receive global efforts from
381 countries that could provide it. They received a third point of inquiry from the delegation from the
382 United Kingdom questioning what "more developed nations" insinuated as well as whether payments
383 would be investments or bankrolling. The delegation from Brazil responded that there were no specific
384 nations in mind as well as leaving payment from loans or bankrolling up to discussion. The delegation
385 from Bulgaria furthered that revisions could be made in unmoderated caucus.

386 Finally, the delegation from Pakistan noted the title of section 2.4 being "strong prosecution"
387 with its clauses raising concerns for national security and sovereignty. They concluded by advocating
388 for the removal of the section in its entirety.

389 Pakistan asked a question regarding the second point of working report RR. They had no issues
390 with this but wanted to change language into a more specific forum of nations. They felt the wording
391 may be too loose. They also felt that the section about a cyber crime task force is good but need more
392 information about this topic.

393 The delegation of the United Kingdom is concerned with sovereignty. They restated their con-
394 cerns about international cooperation between prison systems that are vastly different. They also
395 brought up a point about the working report holding demands rather than suggestions. Lastly, they
396 had concerns about the lack of a section about border security within the report.

397 The delegation of Brazil spoke next discussing sections 2.1 through 2.4. They wanted to clarify
398 that the section wording is not official, but more of a guideline used to create the future report.

399 The United Kingdom spoke again and was concerned with the security of Member States if the
400 committee doesn't speak enough about weapon restrictions. They asked that nations put out state-
401 ments about criminalizing untraceable gun production as it increases illegal weapons sales and law
402 enforcement measures.

403 Austria spoke next, worrying about data security. Brazil responded by saying that all data will
404 be of a non-sensitive nature and that data security will not be a risk. Everything will be secure.

405 The Delegation of the United Kingdom raised a question about the prior agreement that the CJEU
406 would work in tandem with other criminal organizations. They emphasized that such cooperation could
407 strengthen international judicial systems, which is critical for dismantling organized crime syndicates
408 and addressing the root causes of corruption.

409 The delegation of Belarus opposed including the (CJEU) in the resolution, arguing that its ju-
410 risdiction as an European Union body made collaboration with the United Nations impractical. They
411 warned that such proposals could complicate efforts to combat trafficking and corruption as the legal
412 frameworks were incompatible.

413 Pakistan asked a question regarding the second point of working report RR. They had no issues
414 with this but wanted to change language into a more specific forum of nations. They felt the wording
415 may be too loose. They also felt that the section about a cyber crime task force is good but need more
416 information about this topic.

417 The Delegation of Ghana clarified that the EU judicial body was independent and could serve
418 beyond the EU's scope. However, multiple EU Member States supported removing references to the
419 CJEU from the resolution to avoid jurisdictional conflicts.

420 Following these discussions, Czechia decided to remove references to the CJEU from the docu-
421 ment. They highlighted the importance of focusing on universally agreeable measures such as tackling
422 corruption and improving international cooperation to combat transnational crime.

423 The Delegation of Indonesia called for stricter punishments and laws to deter traffickers but
424 requested more detailed provisions. They tied their suggestions to the need for a strong international
425 framework to hold perpetrators accountable and reduce the global prevalence of trafficking.

426 Czechia supported this view noting that penalties should remain within the jurisdiction of indi-
427 vidual states or international organizations like the International Court of Justice (ICJ). They stressed
428 that focusing on prison reform and rehabilitation could help address corruption and improve the treat-
429 ment of those involved in trafficking networks.

430 Czechia supported this view noting that penalties should remain within the jurisdiction of indi-
431 vidual states or international organizations like the ICJ. They stressed that focusing on prison reform
432 and rehabilitation could help address corruption and improve the treatment of those involved in traf-
433 ficking networks.

434 Indonesia, while respecting other delegations' perspectives, reiterated their desire for clearer
435 language about punishments to deter traffickers and reduce corruption in judicial systems.

436 Czechia acknowledged the need for a balanced approach pointing out that not all nations
437 agreed on retributive justice. They emphasized prison reform as a way to rehabilitate traffickers and
438 reduce recidivism, thereby, weakening the networks behind transnational crime.

439 The Delegation of Cuba aligned partially with Indonesia's stance on stricter punishments argu-
440 ing that harsher penalties could deter crime. However, they acknowledged the limitations of punitive
441 measures in addressing the systemic issues driving transnational trafficking such as corruption.

442 The Delegation of Finland highlighted their country's success in reducing crime rates through
443 rehabilitation and systemic reforms. They suggested that such measures including reducing corrup-
444 tion within law enforcement and judicial systems could serve as a model for addressing transnational
445 organized crime.

446 The Delegation of China disagreed with Finland's rehabilitative approach arguing that lenient
447 punishments fail to deter transnational crime syndicates, which operate on a global scale. They em-
448 phasized that addressing corruption and imposing stronger penalties were essential to dismantling
449 these networks.

450 Czechia reiterated that criminal prosecution varied by country and that the committee's focus
451 should remain on combating corruption and improving justice systems to tackle transnational traf-
452 ficking effectively.

453 Finland pointed to their lack of major organized crime issues and low corruption levels as evi-
454 dence of their system's effectiveness.

455 China responded by arguing that Finland's relatively low crime rates stemmed from their unique
456 context, which does not reflect the challenges faced by countries dealing with severe corruption and
457 trafficking issues. They advocated for a balance between retribution and rehabilitation tailored to each
458 country's circumstances.

459 Czechia suggested amending the resolution's language to respect each nation's approach to
460 criminal justice while emphasizing anti-corruption efforts and transnational cooperation.

461 The United Kingdom questioned whether the rehabilitation of gang leaders and terrorists was
462 a feasible approach to curbing organized crime and corruption.

463 Finland argued that while rehabilitation was not always possible, a "hearts and minds" ap-
464 proach had historically helped radicalized individuals, which could weaken criminal organizations over
465 time. They cited South Africa's negotiations during apartheid as an example of addressing systemic
466 issues without exacerbating conflict.

467 Czechia countered that South Africa's success was unique and unlikely to be replicable in the
468 context of transnational crime, which requires coordinated efforts to address corruption and organized
469 criminal networks.

470 The inclusion of both rehabilitation and retribution in the recommendations was suggested as
471 a way to make the section agreeable to more Member States. Czechia reiterated that decisions about
472 criminalization should ultimately rest with individual states, but they emphasized the need for a unified
473 stance against corruption and trafficking.

474 The Delegation of China argued for including both rehabilitation and retribution to ensure all
475 options remain available. They emphasized using court systems and prisons not only to penalize crim-
476 inals but also as tools to prevent future crimes by addressing the systemic drivers of trafficking. China
477 supported the addition of retributive language if rehabilitation is included highlighting the importance
478 of balance in addressing corruption and deterring transnational criminal activity.

479 Finland, however, strongly opposed any mention of retribution, maintaining that a focus on re-
480 habilitation was more effective in curbing trafficking. They suggested that the language surrounding
481 penalties be removed entirely to avoid polarizing Member States and undermining cooperative efforts.

482 Several delegations voiced concerns about the language referencing the CJEU. Ghana noted
483 the importance of framing recommendations in a way that accounts for nations that lack the resources
484 to invest in anti-trafficking technology. They suggested targeting the root causes of trafficking by trac-
485 ing the flow of funds supporting these activities, though they acknowledged that such measures could
486 be controversial.

487 Indonesia expressed understanding of this approach but emphasized their nation's preference
488 for maintaining privacy and sovereignty. They opposed the inclusion of technology-based solutions
489 that require international data sharing, instead, advocating for stricter domestic laws to combat traf-
490 ficking. Indonesia welcomed language in the report that explicitly respects national sovereignty.

491 Brazil raised concerns about mandating participation in technological solutions and proposed
492 adding language to allow countries the option of opting out of such measures. They supported In-
493 donesia's stance on sovereignty arguing that respecting national jurisdictions is essential to fostering
494 trust and collaboration in combating transnational crime.

495 Ghana questioned what “stricter laws” would entail emphasizing the need for clarity. They
496 warned against vague language that could hinder meaningful action stressing the importance of ro-
497 bust tracking mechanisms to disrupt trafficking networks.

498 Brazil argued that the report’s existing section on a shared database already addressed many
499 of these concerns and suggested removing redundant content. They echoed Indonesia’s point about
500 sovereignty noting that international collaboration should not compromise national autonomy.

501 The United States of America proposed the inclusion of a dedicated section on sovereignty to
502 address these concerns and ensure broader support for the resolution. Bulgaria agreed, emphasizing
503 that specific recommendations should remain in the resolution while respecting national jurisdictions.

504 Finland suggested reframing recommendations to align with existing content on sovereignty
505 and corruption reform in other sections of the report. Brazil supported this offering language to prior-
506 itize women and children, groups most vulnerable to trafficking. Ghana countered that while children
507 and women are disproportionately affected, education programs targeting all vulnerable groups are
508 essential for preventing trafficking and addressing its systemic drivers.

509 Czechia suggested clarifying the focus on border security in relation to trafficking rather than
510 general security emphasizing the importance of targeted measures to combat transnational traffick-
511 ing.

512 **3.6 Draft Resolutions**

513 First, the delegation from El Salvador noted the center of confinement for terrorism in their state
514 noting the alarming number of people arrested due to constrictive laws. They outlined the issues of
515 the hopelessness of escape due to 200 year prison sentences among other concerns they wished to
516 be addressed in the report.

517 Then, the delegation from the United Kingdom first applauded El Salvador on their goals for
518 anti-corruption and anti-gang violence, then, questioned the human rights of those incarcerated in the
519 prison. The delegation from El Salvador responded with their awareness of journalists taking extreme
520 measures. They affirmed that everyone is meant to be in the facilities.

521 Then, the delegation from Canada asked how people’s rights are maintained in their state when
522 El Salvador previously deployed military inter-nationally. The delegation from El Salvador responded
523 that there was no martial law; since they accomplished their goal to round up criminals, there was no
524 longer a need for soldiers to patrol the streets.

525 Then, the delegation from Cuba questioned the reactions of neighboring Member States to their
526 proposals. The delegation from El Salvador responded that the mixed reactions they faced was not an
527 issue with their goals.

528 Finally, the delegation from Ghana questioned the solvency of El Salvador’s punishment over
529 reform approach. The delegation from El Salvador responded by reiterating statistics, showcasing how
530 the crime rate has been significantly lowered in their state.

531 The delegation from Brazil started the discussion talking about the importance of curbing transna-
532 tional crime stemming from inside of prison systems. Multiple other members of the Latin American
533 Bloc expressed their concerns about the lack of strength in many prison systems around South Amer-
534 ica.

535 Brazil brought to attention the importance of training prison officials with the goal of enhanc-
536 ing their response to organized transnational crime. Brazil brought up other organizations working on
537 similar issues such as PRIS-COOP. Other Latin American countries and Austria brought up the ideas of
538 using technological advancements such as asynchronous learning to optimize learning. This led to a
539 discussion on the structural injustices of marginalized communities. This led to a discussion on how
540 to use international cooperation to aid in education of prison staff alongside creating a better and
541 quicker response to transnational crime.

542 The delegation of Brazil highlighted the importance of international cooperation in improving
543 the global prison system. Then, the delegations of Pakistan and the United Kingdom expressed con-
544 cerns about the status of national sovereignty and interests among multiple parties’ intervention. Thus,

545 Brazil and Pakistan concluded that it is important to consider the socioeconomic and cultural back-
546 ground of each country's jurisdiction for effective international cooperation. Furthermore, Brazil and
547 Pakistan argued that Member States should approach cooperation voluntarily and should not have
548 any overstepping power.

549 Indonesia specified that falsely incarcerated prisoners as well as the general prison population
550 has detrimental systems in place that actively harm the rehabilitation of the incarcerated. Ghana also
551 added that the treatment of prisoners should be further generalized across the global stage. Mex-
552 ico also expressed the want for safe and healthy living conditions which Indonesia echoed adding the
553 facilities should be standardized across the United Nations Member States in order to prevent incar-
554 ceration in the future. China brought up having similar ideas and would like to implement some sort of
555 a Nordic forward prison system allowing for: some freedoms, better treatment, access to healthcare
556 and decent food. Overall, verifying global support of benefitting the incarcerated to create upstanding
557 citizens that are productive members of society.

558 Indonesia brought up that there should be an overarching theme for all prisons with generally
559 similar resources. China also mentioned that there is no homogeneity or standardization across the
560 global prison system. Austria and Brazil brought up INTERPOL to keep nations accountable in times
561 of incarceration and broadening their scope potentially to allow for more global overview. Libya also
562 urged that it is very necessary to have a strong base in education as well as preventative measures
563 and creating upstanding citizens from the moment they are enrolled in school. This general overview
564 would be beneficial especially to those that are struggling in the global south.

565 During a suspension of the meeting, Brazil proposed the humanitarian treatment of all pris-
566 oners as they believe such treatment would facilitate rehabilitation of criminals, which in turn would
567 prevent crime since there would be less criminals continuously in action. Ghana raised the concern
568 that this idea would perhaps not fall under the purview of this committee. China furthered this point
569 by questioning Brazil on how the humanitarian treatment of prisoners directly prevented transnational
570 crime. Brazil sees its point as more of a recommendation for countries to keep in mind when proposing
571 specific measures that prevent transnational crime. Czechia further clarified that China's ideas would
572 only indirectly help countries reform their systems to prevent criminals from recidivising into their old
573 ways.

574 First, Indonesia brought up the point that Indonesia does not align with the humanitarian incar-
575 ceration sentiment. Then, Brazil brought up that more humanitarian options will not impact Indonesia
576 negatively as it will strengthen retribution and the prison systems internationally. Then, Finland brought
577 up adding a fourteenth point.

578 Following multiple countries' concerns on the issue of sovereignty, Brazil suggested the idea
579 of making a separate point directly talking about a blanket statement on sovereignty. Brazil wrote
580 out a statement calling for the universal declaration of sovereignty for all Member States named 2.0
581 Sovereignty. All members present at the deliberation agreed to the statement on sovereignty.

582 Cuba opposed focusing on humanitarian reforms within prisons stating that such efforts divert
583 attention from the resolution's primary goal of preventing trafficking and combating organized crime.
584 They argued that prioritizing rehabilitation or improved prison conditions risks weakening the punitive
585 measures needed to deter transnational crime.

586 Brazil, however, countered that strengthening prison systems does not preclude punitive mea-
587 sures but ensures that incarceration disrupts trafficking networks rather than enabling them. They em-
588 phasized that corruption within prison systems such as bribery or collusion with criminal organizations
589 must be addressed to reduce the influence of traffickers and their capacity to operate transnationally.

590 **3.7 Education**

591 During a suspension of the meeting, Italy, Mexico, Canada, Brazil, Cuba and Ghana started con-
592 versation surrounding fostering education to prevent crime. Italy brought up the topic because as they
593 say recruitment starts at a young age, which leads to increasing criminal activity. Therefore, they have
594 proposed that if we tackle the lack of access to education, children would be less likely to join criminal
595 organizations later on since that would prevent them from being recruited at a young age while also

596 preventing their exposure to that environment. Italy believes that increased access to education would
597 provide children in poor and marginalized communities with greater opportunities.

598 Conversation between Canada, Ghana, Italy, Mexico, and the United States of America evolved
599 around specifying the content of a program proposed by Mexico that would prevent recidivism. Mexico
600 emphasized the need for raised educational standards in Member States. They brought up the need
601 for more investment in quality content that would educate people from between the ages of ten and
602 twenty five about alternatives to a criminal life, which would include exposing them to gang involve-
603 ment and violence, the judicial system and potential professions.

604 The group discussed how the educational program should include vocational and professional
605 training as well as alternative activities like sports, music and art programs. Canada advocates for
606 implementation and expansion of awareness programs relating to human trafficking, particularly, its
607 disproportionate effects on marginalized people

608 The United States of America acknowledged the inefficiency with past proposed programs such
609 as the American Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) program. In an attempt to correct this, the
610 United States of America proposed that any educational program should ultimately focus on hands-on
611 vocational career training.

612 Ghana raised the concern with impoverished communities who do not have the resources to
613 engage in such programs. They mentioned that while the less fortunate are the most vulnerable to
614 recruitment from traffickers and criminal organizations, developing countries struggle to provide free
615 quality education to those communities.

616 Mexico proposes fundraising and donation efforts to provide materials and facilities to devel-
617 oping countries who lack resources to fulfill these standards. Canada also brought up possible col-
618 laboration with United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) on expanding basic
619 education and access to vital resources. In doing so, would stabilize the fundamental problems that
620 lead to children becoming involved with criminal activity.

621 **4 Adoption of the Report**

622 At its meeting on 26 November 2024, the draft report of the Commission on Crime Prevention
623 and Criminal Justice was made available for consideration. The Commission on Crime Prevention and
624 Criminal Justice considered the report and with no amendments, adopted the report by consensus.

Passed by consensus, with 3 abstentions