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2024 Handbook Cases Before the Court
Topics
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia; Honduras and Costa Rica) Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia; Honduras and Costa Rica)
This is a historical case. In accordance with AMUN rules and procedures, please note that the historical timeline for this case will stop on 6 December 2001. Any and all updates to this case after that date will not be relevant to the AMUN simulation nor considered in hearing the case. While actual Court documents and Memorials can be useful in building foundational knowledge of the case, the American Model United Nations (AMUN) Justices should form their written opinions based on Memorials and Oral Arguments presented by AMUN Advocates..
On 6 December 2001, the Republic of Nicaragua (“Nicaragua”) filed an application with the International Court of Justice instituting proceedings against the Republic of Colombia (“Colombia”) regarding legal issues concerning title to certain island territories and maritime features. In 1928, Nicaragua and Colombia mutually entered into the Barcenas-Esguerra Treaty, which recognized Colombia’s sovereignty over the Archipelago of San Andres and stated Nicaragua had no claim or interest of claim to the Archipelago’s Roncador, Quitasueno and Serrana. Included, but less relevant, was the recognition by Colombia of Nicaragua’s sovereignty over the Mosquito Coast and the Islas Mangles, two islands of the San Andres Archipelago. Finally, it was established that the 82 West Meridian would serve as the maritime limit between both countries.
In 1969, Nicaragua began issuing licenses for exploration and commercial use of the waters west of the 82 West Meridian. By 1980, Nicaragua began disclaiming the validity of the 1928 Treaty altogether because it had been signed under military occupation by the United States and thus did not represent a sovereign decision. Colombia, in response, would detain any boats with Nicaraguan licenses or flying the Nicaraguan flag and would escort them to San Andres or back over the 82 West Meridian.
Citing the Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), Nicaragua asserts they have title to the Roncado, Quitasueño, Serrana and Serranilla Keys that lie north of the Archipelago since these keys and maritime features lie within 200 miles of their economic zone. Nicaragua claims the Barcenas-Esguerra Treaty of 1928 is invalid, thus making the Treaty an inappropriate means of exacting the right to title. Colombia has patrolled the waters in and around the disputed territory, particularly stopping vessels licensed in Nicaragua and escorting them to a controlled port on San Andres Island. Nicaragua holds that this alleged illegal assertion of the right to title and control of the maritime area has impacted its citizens and their maritime economy on the Caribbean coast.
Colombia, for its part, argues the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the application because the issues have been previously resolved through the mutually agreed to the Barcenas Esguerra Treaty in 1928. In this Treaty, Colombia was granted control of the San Andres islands. Thus, Colombia disagrees with Nicaragua’s position of jurisdiction and refutes Nicargua’s argument that military occupation by the United States invalidated the treaty. Further, both Nicaragua and Colombia are parties to the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement of 1948, known as the “Pact of Bogota”. In Article VI of the Pact, it says, “The aforesaid procedures, furthermore, may not be applied to matters already settled by arrangement between the parties, or by arbitral award or by decision of an international court, or which are governed by agreements or treaties in force on the date of the conclusion of the present Treaty.” Thus, Colombia argues the Pact prohibits the Court’s intervention in this case. Colombia’s third objection to jurisdiction cites the 1988 Case concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), claiming that a similar issue has already been resolved in the ICJ and, therefore, prohibits jurisdiction. Colombia argues that the reasons for granting jurisdiction by Nicaragua are a misapplication of the 1948 Pact of Bogotá.
The Court must determine whether it has the jurisdiction to rule on this case. If jurisdiction is found, it should examine the validity of the 1928 Barcenas-Esguerra Treaty when considering Nicaragua’s ability to enter into a treaty while under foreign influence. Finally, the Court should decide whether Colombia or Nicaragua has title to the outlined island territories and maritime features.
Questions to Consider:
- Does a treaty signed while a party was influenced or under colonial rule have legal standing?
- Does more recent international law take precedence over previously signed treaties when considering the outcome of a dispute?
- When considering a dispute involving maritime economic/territorial boundaries, how much significance should be placed on agreements enacted before establishing the United Nations?
Bibliography
- American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (1948).
- Bekker, Pieter (2001). Nicaragua Sues Colombia before the World Court over a Dispute Concerning Territorial Questions and Maritime Delimitation in the Western Caribbean.
- American Society of International Law.
- International Court of Justice (2004). Written Statement of the government of Nicaragua.
- United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
- International Court of Justice (2003). Preliminary Objections of the Government of Colombia (Nicaragua v. Colombia).
- International Court of Justice (2001). Application Instituting Proceedings (Nicaragua v. Colombia).
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal)
This is a historical case. In accordance with AMUN rules and procedures, please note that the historical timeline for this case will stop on 19 February 2009. Any and all updates to this case after that date will not be relevant to the AMUN simulation nor considered in hearing the case. While actual Court documents and Memorials can be useful in building foundational knowledge of the case, the American Model United Nations (AMUN) Justices should form their written opinions based on Memorials and Oral Arguments presented by AMUN Advocates.
On 19 February 2009, the Kingdom of Belgium (“Belgium”) filed an Application with the International Court of Justice (“the Court”) against the Republic of Senegal (“Senegal”), alleging Senegal had a duty to prosecute or extradite Hissène Habré under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), and had failed to uphold that duty. Hissène Habré was the President of Chad from 1982 to 1990. During his time as President, he is accused of committing grievous war crimes, including murder, rape and torture. After being overthrown, Habré fled to Senegal, where he was granted political asylum by the Senegalese Government.
Several of Habré’s alleged victims filed a criminal complaint in Senegal in January 2000, accusing him of Crimes Against Humanity, violating the Convention Against Torture (1984) and customary law. A Senegalese judge indicted Habré but the appellate courts dismissed the case on the grounds that the Senegalese courts did not have jurisdiction to try international crimes.
In 2005, alleged victims, including Belgian citizens, filed a criminal complaint in Belgium, whereafter Habré was indicted and his extradition was requested. The Senegalese Government decided it did not have the jurisdiction to rule on Belgium’s extradition request and referred the case to the African Union (AU). The African Union established a Committee of Eminent African Jurists to assess whether Habré should be tried in Senegal or extradited to Belgium. In 2006, the committee recommended Habré be tried in Senegal on behalf of Africa, and Senegal accepted.
In its 2009 Application to the International Court of Justice, Belgium argued the Court had jurisdiction under Article 30 of the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture), which has been ratified by both nation-states. Under Article 30, Belgium argues former heads of state are subject to universal jurisdiction for grave violations of international law. Belgium argues Senegal was obligated to prosecute Habré for the crimes that had been ascribed to him, and by failing to extradite him to Belgium and their continual delay in prosecution constituted Senegal’s violation of these obligations.
Accompanying their Application, Belgium submitted a Request for the indication of provisional measures. This indication asked the Court to order “Senegal to take all the steps within its power to keep Mr. H. Habré under the control and surveillance of the judicial authorities of Senegal so that the rules of international law with which Belgium requests compliance may be correctly applied.”
Belgium argues Senegal disagreed with it on the meaning of certain provisions of the Convention against Torture and requested its interpretation by the Court. Since Senegal failed to extradite or initiate criminal inquiry against Habré thus far, Belgium contended that Senegal’s actions and inactions violated the Convention against Torture and other rules of conventional and customary international law.
Senegal disputes Belgium’s claims and postulates the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this issue since they have adopted a clear position regarding the Convention against Torture and have taken steps towards prosecuting Habré. Senegal argues any interference by the Court would disturb a clear state of affairs between the parties, creating an artificial conflict where one does not exist, as there is an absence of any dispute between the two parties. Therefore, Belgium’s Application should be rendered inadmissible.
Thus, the Court must consider whether it has jurisdiction to issue a decision under conventional and customary international law, including the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. If the Court finds that they do have jurisdiction, the Court must interpret the obligations under international law regarding the duty to prosecute or extradite individuals accused of certain serious crimes, such as crimes against humanity and war crimes. Finally, the Court must analyze the concept of state responsibility to determine whether Senegal had failed in its obligations.
Questions to consider from your country’s perspective:
- Does the Court have the jurisdiction to issue a decision in this dispute?
- Does a dispute between the Nation States of Belgium and Senegal exist?
- How does the Court apply each party’s commitment to the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to this particular case?
- What obligations do Member States have to prosecute crimes from other States under the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment?
Bibliography
- Andena, Mads and Thomas Weatherall (2013). International Court of Justice: Questions Relating to the Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (Belgium v. Senegal) Judgement of 20 July 2012.
- International Court of Justice (2017). Case Overview.
- International Court of Justice (2011). Memorial of the Republic of Senegal.
- International Court of Justice (2010). Memorial of the Kingdom of Belgium.
- International Court Of Justice (2009). Belgium Application.
- International Court Of Justice (2009). Request for Indication of Provisional Measures by the Kingdom of Belgium.
- United Nations Office of the High Commissioner (1984). Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia) Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia)
This is a historical case. In accordance with AMUN rules and procedures, please note that the historical timeline for this case will stop on 1 December 1990. Any and all updates to this case after that date will not be relevant to the AMUN simulation nor considered in hearing the case. While actual Court documents and Memorials can be useful in building foundational knowledge of the case, the American Model United Nations (AMUN) Justices should form their written opinions based on Memorials and Oral Arguments presented by AMUN Advocates.
In 1989, the Republic of Nauru (“Nauru”) filed an Application to institute proceedings in the International Court of Justice (“the Court”) against the Commonwealth of Australia (“Australia”) to rehabilitate phosphate lands Australia mined during its administration before Nauruan independence.
After World War I, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom were granted co-Trusteeship of Nauru, granting all three countries access to the rich phosphate deposits there. The agreement explicitly permitted the mining of the phosphate deposits under the provisions of Article 22. Upon the League of Nations dissolution, the previous agreement became invalid, and the United Nations emerged as a new forum. Thus, Nauru and Australia entered into a treaty on 1 November 1947 to place Nauru under the trusteeship of Australia, with the authority granted by the United Nations International Trusteeship System. Within this agreement, Australia had joint authority with New Zealand and the United Kingdom to exercise the administration of Nauru.
Provisions of this agreement included the stated objectives concerning Article 76 of the United Nations Charter, which states a basic tenant of the trusteeship system is “to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories…”. The 1947 agreement between Nauru and Australia states Australia must “take into consideration the customs and usages of the inhabitants of Nauru and respect the rights and safeguard the interests, both present and future, of the indigenous inhabitants of the Territory…”.
Nauru finds jurisdiction of the Court in this case under Article 36 of the Court’s Statute, “the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation.” Nauru argues Australia mined phosphate from Nauruan land, resulting in massive environmental degradation with no benefit for Nauru and resulting in a breach of its trusteeship obligations under Article 76 of the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement of 1947. Further, Nauru claims Australia has made no effort to fix or ameliorate the environmental effects of the mining, arguing that this is a breach of their trusteeship obligations under international law, particularly infringing on Nauru’s right to self-determination and permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Nauru requests the Court order Australia to make restitution or other reparations for the damages suffered.
Australia argues the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this matter based on its position that jurisdiction can “not apply to any dispute regarding which the Parties thereto have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement” per the Statute of the Court. Further, Australia argues any dispute arising from a trusteeship should be considered settled when the trusteeship is terminated. Australia emphasizes the Nauru Island Phosphate Agreement of 1967 between Nauru, New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom and states Nauru waived its claim to rehabilitate the phosphate lands within said agreement.
The Court must first determine whether it has jurisdiction to issue an opinion on this dispute and under what statute it finds jurisdiction. Further, concerning Article 76 of the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement of 1947, the Court must settle whether Nauru is entitled to reparations from Australia.
Questions to consider from your country’s perspective:
- Under what international law does the Court have the authority to issue an opinion on this dispute?
- What responsibilities does Australia have to Nauru under Article 74 of the United Nations Charter?
- Does the 1967 agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Nauru invalidate Nauru’s claim for reparations?
Bibliography
- Angie, Anthony (1993). Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru. The American Journal of International Law.
- Statute of the International Court of Justice (1946).
- International Court of Justice (1989). Application instituting proceedings (Nauru v. Australia).
- International Court of Justice (1990). Preliminary Objections of the Government of Australia.
- International Court of Justice (2024). Overview of the Case: Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia).
- Scobbie, Iain (1993). Case Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections Judgment (1993). International and Comparative Law Quarterly.
- The Covenant of the League of Nations (1924).
- The Nauru Island Phosphate Agreement (1967).
- Treaty of Versailles (1919).
- Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Nauru (1947).
- United Nations Charter (1945).
Topics
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia; Honduras and Costa Rica) Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia; Honduras and Costa Rica)
This is a historical case. In accordance with AMUN rules and procedures, please note that the historical timeline for this case will stop on 6 December 2001. Any and all updates to this case after that date will not be relevant to the AMUN simulation nor considered in hearing the case. While actual Court documents and Memorials can be useful in building foundational knowledge of the case, the American Model United Nations (AMUN) Justices should form their written opinions based on Memorials and Oral Arguments presented by AMUN Advocates..
On 6 December 2001, the Republic of Nicaragua (“Nicaragua”) filed an application with the International Court of Justice instituting proceedings against the Republic of Colombia (“Colombia”) regarding legal issues concerning title to certain island territories and maritime features. In 1928, Nicaragua and Colombia mutually entered into the Barcenas-Esguerra Treaty, which recognized Colombia’s sovereignty over the Archipelago of San Andres and stated Nicaragua had no claim or interest of claim to the Archipelago’s Roncador, Quitasueno and Serrana. Included, but less relevant, was the recognition by Colombia of Nicaragua’s sovereignty over the Mosquito Coast and the Islas Mangles, two islands of the San Andres Archipelago. Finally, it was established that the 82 West Meridian would serve as the maritime limit between both countries.
In 1969, Nicaragua began issuing licenses for exploration and commercial use of the waters west of the 82 West Meridian. By 1980, Nicaragua began disclaiming the validity of the 1928 Treaty altogether because it had been signed under military occupation by the United States and thus did not represent a sovereign decision. Colombia, in response, would detain any boats with Nicaraguan licenses or flying the Nicaraguan flag and would escort them to San Andres or back over the 82 West Meridian.
Citing the Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), Nicaragua asserts they have title to the Roncado, Quitasueño, Serrana and Serranilla Keys that lie north of the Archipelago since these keys and maritime features lie within 200 miles of their economic zone. Nicaragua claims the Barcenas-Esguerra Treaty of 1928 is invalid, thus making the Treaty an inappropriate means of exacting the right to title. Colombia has patrolled the waters in and around the disputed territory, particularly stopping vessels licensed in Nicaragua and escorting them to a controlled port on San Andres Island. Nicaragua holds that this alleged illegal assertion of the right to title and control of the maritime area has impacted its citizens and their maritime economy on the Caribbean coast.
Colombia, for its part, argues the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the application because the issues have been previously resolved through the mutually agreed to the Barcenas Esguerra Treaty in 1928. In this Treaty, Colombia was granted control of the San Andres islands. Thus, Colombia disagrees with Nicaragua’s position of jurisdiction and refutes Nicargua’s argument that military occupation by the United States invalidated the treaty. Further, both Nicaragua and Colombia are parties to the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement of 1948, known as the “Pact of Bogota”. In Article VI of the Pact, it says, “The aforesaid procedures, furthermore, may not be applied to matters already settled by arrangement between the parties, or by arbitral award or by decision of an international court, or which are governed by agreements or treaties in force on the date of the conclusion of the present Treaty.” Thus, Colombia argues the Pact prohibits the Court’s intervention in this case. Colombia’s third objection to jurisdiction cites the 1988 Case concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), claiming that a similar issue has already been resolved in the ICJ and, therefore, prohibits jurisdiction. Colombia argues that the reasons for granting jurisdiction by Nicaragua are a misapplication of the 1948 Pact of Bogotá.
The Court must determine whether it has the jurisdiction to rule on this case. If jurisdiction is found, it should examine the validity of the 1928 Barcenas-Esguerra Treaty when considering Nicaragua’s ability to enter into a treaty while under foreign influence. Finally, the Court should decide whether Colombia or Nicaragua has title to the outlined island territories and maritime features.
Questions to Consider:
- Does a treaty signed while a party was influenced or under colonial rule have legal standing?
- Does more recent international law take precedence over previously signed treaties when considering the outcome of a dispute?
- When considering a dispute involving maritime economic/territorial boundaries, how much significance should be placed on agreements enacted before establishing the United Nations?
Bibliography
- American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (1948).
- Bekker, Pieter (2001). Nicaragua Sues Colombia before the World Court over a Dispute Concerning Territorial Questions and Maritime Delimitation in the Western Caribbean.
- American Society of International Law.
- International Court of Justice (2004). Written Statement of the government of Nicaragua.
- United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
- International Court of Justice (2003). Preliminary Objections of the Government of Colombia (Nicaragua v. Colombia).
- International Court of Justice (2001). Application Instituting Proceedings (Nicaragua v. Colombia).
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal)
This is a historical case. In accordance with AMUN rules and procedures, please note that the historical timeline for this case will stop on 19 February 2009. Any and all updates to this case after that date will not be relevant to the AMUN simulation nor considered in hearing the case. While actual Court documents and Memorials can be useful in building foundational knowledge of the case, the American Model United Nations (AMUN) Justices should form their written opinions based on Memorials and Oral Arguments presented by AMUN Advocates.
On 19 February 2009, the Kingdom of Belgium (“Belgium”) filed an Application with the International Court of Justice (“the Court”) against the Republic of Senegal (“Senegal”), alleging Senegal had a duty to prosecute or extradite Hissène Habré under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), and had failed to uphold that duty. Hissène Habré was the President of Chad from 1982 to 1990. During his time as President, he is accused of committing grievous war crimes, including murder, rape and torture. After being overthrown, Habré fled to Senegal, where he was granted political asylum by the Senegalese Government.
Several of Habré’s alleged victims filed a criminal complaint in Senegal in January 2000, accusing him of Crimes Against Humanity, violating the Convention Against Torture (1984) and customary law. A Senegalese judge indicted Habré but the appellate courts dismissed the case on the grounds that the Senegalese courts did not have jurisdiction to try international crimes.
In 2005, alleged victims, including Belgian citizens, filed a criminal complaint in Belgium, whereafter Habré was indicted and his extradition was requested. The Senegalese Government decided it did not have the jurisdiction to rule on Belgium’s extradition request and referred the case to the African Union (AU). The African Union established a Committee of Eminent African Jurists to assess whether Habré should be tried in Senegal or extradited to Belgium. In 2006, the committee recommended Habré be tried in Senegal on behalf of Africa, and Senegal accepted.
In its 2009 Application to the International Court of Justice, Belgium argued the Court had jurisdiction under Article 30 of the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture), which has been ratified by both nation-states. Under Article 30, Belgium argues former heads of state are subject to universal jurisdiction for grave violations of international law. Belgium argues Senegal was obligated to prosecute Habré for the crimes that had been ascribed to him, and by failing to extradite him to Belgium and their continual delay in prosecution constituted Senegal’s violation of these obligations.
Accompanying their Application, Belgium submitted a Request for the indication of provisional measures. This indication asked the Court to order “Senegal to take all the steps within its power to keep Mr. H. Habré under the control and surveillance of the judicial authorities of Senegal so that the rules of international law with which Belgium requests compliance may be correctly applied.”
Belgium argues Senegal disagreed with it on the meaning of certain provisions of the Convention against Torture and requested its interpretation by the Court. Since Senegal failed to extradite or initiate criminal inquiry against Habré thus far, Belgium contended that Senegal’s actions and inactions violated the Convention against Torture and other rules of conventional and customary international law.
Senegal disputes Belgium’s claims and postulates the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this issue since they have adopted a clear position regarding the Convention against Torture and have taken steps towards prosecuting Habré. Senegal argues any interference by the Court would disturb a clear state of affairs between the parties, creating an artificial conflict where one does not exist, as there is an absence of any dispute between the two parties. Therefore, Belgium’s Application should be rendered inadmissible.
Thus, the Court must consider whether it has jurisdiction to issue a decision under conventional and customary international law, including the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. If the Court finds that they do have jurisdiction, the Court must interpret the obligations under international law regarding the duty to prosecute or extradite individuals accused of certain serious crimes, such as crimes against humanity and war crimes. Finally, the Court must analyze the concept of state responsibility to determine whether Senegal had failed in its obligations.
Questions to consider from your country’s perspective:
- Does the Court have the jurisdiction to issue a decision in this dispute?
- Does a dispute between the Nation States of Belgium and Senegal exist?
- How does the Court apply each party’s commitment to the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to this particular case?
- What obligations do Member States have to prosecute crimes from other States under the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment?
Bibliography
- Andena, Mads and Thomas Weatherall (2013). International Court of Justice: Questions Relating to the Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (Belgium v. Senegal) Judgement of 20 July 2012.
- International Court of Justice (2017). Case Overview.
- International Court of Justice (2011). Memorial of the Republic of Senegal.
- International Court of Justice (2010). Memorial of the Kingdom of Belgium.
- International Court Of Justice (2009). Belgium Application.
- International Court Of Justice (2009). Request for Indication of Provisional Measures by the Kingdom of Belgium.
- United Nations Office of the High Commissioner (1984). Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia) Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia)
This is a historical case. In accordance with AMUN rules and procedures, please note that the historical timeline for this case will stop on 1 December 1990. Any and all updates to this case after that date will not be relevant to the AMUN simulation nor considered in hearing the case. While actual Court documents and Memorials can be useful in building foundational knowledge of the case, the American Model United Nations (AMUN) Justices should form their written opinions based on Memorials and Oral Arguments presented by AMUN Advocates.
In 1989, the Republic of Nauru (“Nauru”) filed an Application to institute proceedings in the International Court of Justice (“the Court”) against the Commonwealth of Australia (“Australia”) to rehabilitate phosphate lands Australia mined during its administration before Nauruan independence.
After World War I, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom were granted co-Trusteeship of Nauru, granting all three countries access to the rich phosphate deposits there. The agreement explicitly permitted the mining of the phosphate deposits under the provisions of Article 22. Upon the League of Nations dissolution, the previous agreement became invalid, and the United Nations emerged as a new forum. Thus, Nauru and Australia entered into a treaty on 1 November 1947 to place Nauru under the trusteeship of Australia, with the authority granted by the United Nations International Trusteeship System. Within this agreement, Australia had joint authority with New Zealand and the United Kingdom to exercise the administration of Nauru.
Provisions of this agreement included the stated objectives concerning Article 76 of the United Nations Charter, which states a basic tenant of the trusteeship system is “to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories…”. The 1947 agreement between Nauru and Australia states Australia must “take into consideration the customs and usages of the inhabitants of Nauru and respect the rights and safeguard the interests, both present and future, of the indigenous inhabitants of the Territory…”.
Nauru finds jurisdiction of the Court in this case under Article 36 of the Court’s Statute, “the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation.” Nauru argues Australia mined phosphate from Nauruan land, resulting in massive environmental degradation with no benefit for Nauru and resulting in a breach of its trusteeship obligations under Article 76 of the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement of 1947. Further, Nauru claims Australia has made no effort to fix or ameliorate the environmental effects of the mining, arguing that this is a breach of their trusteeship obligations under international law, particularly infringing on Nauru’s right to self-determination and permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Nauru requests the Court order Australia to make restitution or other reparations for the damages suffered.
Australia argues the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this matter based on its position that jurisdiction can “not apply to any dispute regarding which the Parties thereto have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement” per the Statute of the Court. Further, Australia argues any dispute arising from a trusteeship should be considered settled when the trusteeship is terminated. Australia emphasizes the Nauru Island Phosphate Agreement of 1967 between Nauru, New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom and states Nauru waived its claim to rehabilitate the phosphate lands within said agreement.
The Court must first determine whether it has jurisdiction to issue an opinion on this dispute and under what statute it finds jurisdiction. Further, concerning Article 76 of the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement of 1947, the Court must settle whether Nauru is entitled to reparations from Australia.
Questions to consider from your country’s perspective:
- Under what international law does the Court have the authority to issue an opinion on this dispute?
- What responsibilities does Australia have to Nauru under Article 74 of the United Nations Charter?
- Does the 1967 agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Nauru invalidate Nauru’s claim for reparations?
Bibliography
- Angie, Anthony (1993). Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru. The American Journal of International Law.
- Statute of the International Court of Justice (1946).
- International Court of Justice (1989). Application instituting proceedings (Nauru v. Australia).
- International Court of Justice (1990). Preliminary Objections of the Government of Australia.
- International Court of Justice (2024). Overview of the Case: Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia).
- Scobbie, Iain (1993). Case Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections Judgment (1993). International and Comparative Law Quarterly.
- The Covenant of the League of Nations (1924).
- The Nauru Island Phosphate Agreement (1967).
- Treaty of Versailles (1919).
- Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Nauru (1947).
- United Nations Charter (1945).